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Abstract 
This article considers how empirical legal studies (ELS) and doctrinal legal research (DLR) 
interact. Rather than seeing them as competitors which are methodologically independent and 
static, it suggests that they are interdependent activities, which may each be changed by 
interaction with the other, and that this change brings both opportunities and threats. For 
ELS, the article argues that DLR should properly be understood as part of its theoretical 
framework, yet in practice little attention is given to doctrine in empirical work. Paying more 
attention to DLR and legal frames generally would help ELS meet the common criticism that 
it is under-theorized and over policy-oriented. On the other hand, an embrace of legal 
thinking, particularly of critical legal thinking, might lead to loss of status for ELS in policy 
circles and mainstream social science. For DLR, ELS offers a chance for it to escape the 
threat of insular sterility and irrelevance, and to participate in a founded commentary on the 
world. The risk, however, is that in tailoring legal analysis to what can be empirically 
researched legal scholars become less analytically ambitious, more safe, and their 
traditionally important role as a source of socially relevant critique is weakened. Inevitably, 
in offering different ways of moving to normative conclusions about the law ELS and DLR 
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There has been a trend for some years for American law schools to expand the amount of 
empirical research done within their walls, and this trend is spreading to Europe.1 As with 
any new entry to a competitive field – and research is certainly competitive on the individual, 
institutional and perhaps national levels -  this development raises the questions: who wins, 
and who loses? 
 
The most obvious and immediate axes of competition are between empirical legal studies 
(ELS) and traditional doctrinal legal research (DLR), and between law faculties and faculties 
of social science. The expansion of ELS could be seen as a move by assertive social scientists 
                                               
1 J. Balkin, ‘Interdisciplinarity as Colonization’, 53 Washington and Lee Law Review 949 (1996); Elizabeth 
Chambliss, ‘When Do Facts Persuade – Some Thoughts on the Market for Empirical Legal Studies’, 71 
Law and Contemporary Problems 17 (2008); R. van Gestel and H. Micklitz, ‘Methods in European Legal 




to challenge DLR as a way of speaking about law in society, or it could be seen as a move by 
assertive (and, in the US, rich) law schools to challenge faculties of social science at their 
own game.  
 
That is not to say that the process is necessarily a simple head-to-head contest. Absorption, 
interdisciplinarity – or failed colonization as Balkin thought-provokingly calls it – and 
fragmentation are among the reactions that disciplines may provoke when they meet.2 As 
ELS expands it may find that the environment of the law school changes it – that it absorbs 
more qualitative methods and is more and more subject to the theoretical frames found in 
legal thinking rather than those drawn purely from social and human sciences. If law schools 
successfully become major players in the (largely quantitative) social science world, they 
may find that doing so changes their own character and diminishes their autonomy, as they 
become subject to the methodological disciplines of a wider field. The colonizer is, 
inevitably, also changed, even to some extent colonized.3 
 
I am interested in how the future of ELS and doctrine, and law schools, will reveal itself, and 
whether a simple competition for dominance will play out or whether, in particular, ELS and 
doctrine will exert mutual influence and perhaps converge in method and interests, and what 
that will mean for all those involved. 
 
One small step towards forming an expectation about this – a predictive theory perhaps – is 
to think about the principled relationship between ELS and DLR. What is it that they each try 
to do? What are their essential differences? In what ways are they related, even inter-
                                               
2 Balkin, ibid. 
3 Ibid 
dependent? This does not tell us how their futures will develop, but it hints at how they might 
and may contribute to thinking about how they should. It provides a basis, perhaps, for future 
empirical research. 
 
This article tries to explore that relationship. It begins, inevitably, with a brief account of the 
rise of ELS, which it tries to place in the context of other legal research movements, as well 
as institutional and educational developments. It then moves on to ask how the relationship, 
or interrelationship between ELS and DLR is often idealized, and how it has been in practice, 
and, finally, which relationship would be the most coherent and synergetic. Then, in the last 
part of the article, the price of that coherent synergy is explored. If ELS and DLR become 
part of a shared project to understand the working of law in action, they each, inevitably, give 
up some autonomy, both in their research agendas and their methodology. How do they 
change and what do they give up if they come within the orbit of each other?  
 
To some extent this debate has been had. There is extensive scholarly work on the 
methodological and political problems of ELS – from a lawyer’s, particularly a critical 
lawyer’s, perspective – as well as robust defenses of it. Much of this will be rehearsed in the 
text below. However, my aim in looking at this critique is not to see which kind of research is 
‘best’, however that might be defined. Instead, the critique will be used to help understand 
how different ways of studying the legal system could influence each other, and what there is 
to be gained and lost by the existing methodological communities. In particular I want to 
explore this from a European perspective, which is why I place DLR central, the archetypal 
law school activity, rather than the more critical-theoretical or overtly political forms of legal 
commentary which tend to dominate debate in the US.4 
 
Having said that, in what follows, I take DLR to be a relatively broad church. It does not 
encompass pure legal theory, nor Critical Legal Studies in its most radical form, that is to say 
where any positivist understanding of the law at all is treated as irrelevant.5 However, it does 
include scholarship which seeks to theorize on the basis of law, as well as the traditional 
exposition of law. It is all that legal scholarship which begins with, or rests upon, some form 
of positivist investigation, as I perceive most European legal scholarship does, wherever that 
investigation may ultimately lead.6 What the law ‘is’ may be a question that many scholars 
recognize to be complex, indeterminate, unanswerable, often misleading, and perhaps even 
dangerous, but it continues to inform their agendas for research. How will it change if law 
schools move to invest in the empirical measurement of what the law ‘does’?   
 
2. THE EMERGENCE OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
 
2.1 The Space which ELS Fills 
 
Empirical research into the origins, working and consequence of law has a reasonably long 
history, with Legal Realism often being named as the movement which first gave it a 
                                               
4 Van Gestel and Micklitz, above n. 1; E.V. Towfigh, ‘Empirical arguments in public law doctrine: Should 
empirical legal studies make a “doctrinal turn”?’ 12 ICON 670 (2014). 
5 G. Shaffer, ‘The New Legal Realist Approach to International Law’, 28 Leiden Journal of International Law 
189 (2015). 
6 J. Vranken, 'Exciting Times for Legal Scholarship', Law and Method 42 (2012) 
prominent place in the legal academy.7 The legal realists’ assertion that there was a difference 
between ‘law in the books’ and ‘law in action’, as it is sometimes phrased today,8 was a 
challenge to the adequacy of doctrine as a way of explaining or understanding law. Legal 
Realism has in turn has been traced back to the ‘Free Law’ movement in early 20th Century 
Germany.9 
 
Once scholars accepted that law could be studied in non-doctrinal ways, this opened the door 
to a rich variety of perspectives and methods, from feminist, post-colonial and critical legal 
studies through to law and economics, passing through socio-legal studies, sociological 
jurisprudence and McDougall-Lasswell policy science, to mention a few of the schools 
within broader legal studies.10 The areas of academic life, and indeed the countries, where 
these managed to gain a foothold and achieve prominence have varied, as do their political 
and methodological agendas. 
                                               
7 Van Gestel and Micklitz, above n. 1. 
8 P. Mascini and W. van Rossum, ‘Empirical Legal Research: Fad, Feud or Fellowship?’, Erasmus Law Review 
89 (2018). 
9 J. Herget and S. Wallace, ‘The German Free Law Movement as the Source of American Legal Realism’, 73 
Virginia Law Review 399 (1987). 
10 See for overviews e.g. R. Unger, ‘The Critical Legal Studies Movement’, 96 Harvard Law Review 561 
(1983); E. Christodoulidis,  R. Dukes, and M. Goldoni (eds.), Research Handbook on Critical Legal Theory 
(2019); N. Kreutzfeldt, M. Mason and K McConnachie, Routledge Handbook of Socio-Legal Theory and 
Methods (2019); R. Cotterell, Sociological Jurisprudence: Juristic Thought and Social Enquiry (2017); R. 
Posner, ‘The Law and Economics Movement’ 77(2) The American Economic Review, 1 (1987). 
P. Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Law as Socio-Legal Theory: The Challenges for “Law in Context” in a Divided 
World’, 67 Buffalo Law Review 909 (2019);  J. Van Doren and C. J. Roedererer, ‘McDougal-Lasswell Policy 
Science: Death and Transfiguration’, 11 Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 125 (2012). 
 
Many of these approaches were developed by lawyers, or within law schools, or have at least 
found a comfortable niche within the legal academy and co-exist in a more or less stable, if 
not quite symbiotic, relationship with more doctrinal approaches. Indeed, law schools are the 
traditional homes of interdisciplinary research – one is far more likely to find a philosopher, 
psychologist or political scientist within a law school than vice versa. However, the 
approaches to studying legal processes which rely on the most orthodox social science 
methods, and are the most traditionally empirical and quantitative, have tended to be centred 
within faculties of social science or economics, where the necessary methodological expertise 
lies. 11 Until recently, this research, and the work of more traditional doctrinal lawyers, have 
existed largely in a state of comfortable mutual indifference – mutual citation, for example, 
being exceptional and mostly symbolic. ELS is often understood as an attempt to change this 
– to bring mainstream social science methods into law schools, and to legitimate the 
empirical approach to law among lawyers.12 This is proving to be disruptive, both 
institutionally and intellectually.  
 
ELS, and the trend it represents, did not emerge from nowhere. It can be seen as the product, 
perhaps culmination, of a number of empirical legal movements of recent years, beginning 
                                               
11 J. Baldwin and G. Davis, ‘Empirical Research in Law’, in M. Tushnet and P. Cane (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Legal Studies 880 (2005). 
12 Baldwin and Davis, ibid; T.J. Miles and C.R. Sunstein, ‘The New Legal Realism’, 75 University of Chicago 
Law Review 831 (2008);  M.C. Suchman and E. Mertz, ‘Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Legal 
Studies and New Legal Realism’, 6 Annual Review of Law and Sociology 555 (2010); D. Blocq and M. van der 
Woude, ‘Making Sense of the Law and Society Movement’, Erasmus Law Review, 134 (2018). 
with the ‘law and’ movement, of the second half of the twentieth century.13 The most 
prominent part of this was law and economics in the US, which, in typically economic style, 
offered not just an apparently empirically and theoretically founded description of law but 
also a normative guide to its use: a complete ideology of law. While profoundly influential in 
the US, it did not have the same impact in Europe, and has tended to be relatively self-
contained: believers and non-believers have relatively little to say to each other. The other 
important ‘law and’ was the Law and Society movement (LS), which tries to understand the 
interaction between rules and their social context, and was the heir to legal realism and the 
forerunner of ELS.14 
 
The most well-known mission statement of ELS, to do ‘legally sophisticated empirical 
[analysis]’ is not inherently different or conflicting with that of LS,15 or the movement known 
as New Legal Realism (NLR), which emerged around the same time as ELS, just before the 
millennium.16 It has been commented that these three groups are porous and overlapping both 
in terms of the people participating and the subjects and methods.17 However, there are 
widespread perceptions of differences in style, politics and methodology, particularly 
                                               
13 Generally, see T. Eisenberg ‘The Origins, Nature, And Promise Of Empirical Legal Studies And A Response 
To Concerns’ University of Illinois Law Review 1713 (2011); Chambliss, above n. 1. 
14 See Blocq and van der Woude, above n. 12. 
15 T. Eisenberg, ‘Why do Empirical Legal Scholarship?’, 41 San Diego Law Review 1741 at 1741 (2004). 
16 E. Mertz, S. Macaulay and T. W. Mitchell (eds.), The New Regal Realism: Translating Law-and-Society for 
Today’s Legal Practice (2016); H. Klug, and S. E. Merry (eds.), The New Regal Realism: Studying Law 
Globally (2016). 
17 Chambliss, above n. 1. 
between LS and ELS. NLR is somewhat less prominent, and considered closer to LS in spirit, 
and is more driven by legal academics.18 
 
ELS is generally considered to have a largely quantitative methodological orientation, and to 
be primarily policy-oriented, although in ELS journals and conferences this is usually not 
formalized – it is merely present as a prevailing orientation.19 The contrast is with LS, which 
is typically more qualitative, self-reflective, methodologically diverse, and critical.20 Lawyers 
who identify with the LS movement often have a progressive social agenda, and desire to 
challenge assumptions and underlying values in the law.21 ELS is often seen as providing 
practical advice to policy-makers on the effectiveness of the law. It is further from doctrine 
and interpretation than LS, but closer to mainstream social sciences in method, and its 
tendency to avoid overt normativity.22 
 
The empirical turn in legal studies is often said to be born partly out of a frustration with the 
limits of doctrine, and with formalism.23 This is true in the US, and will be equally true in 
Europe, particularly in fields such as EU law, which are goal-oriented, and where lawyers 
                                               
18 Chambliss, ibid; Shaffer, above n. 5; M. McCann, ‘Preface to the New Legal Realism’ in Mertz, Macaulay 
and Mitchell, above n. 16, xiii. 
19 E.V. Towfigh, ‘Empirical arguments in public law doctrine: Should empirical legal studies make a “doctrinal 
turn”?’ 12 ICON 670 (2014); M. Suchman ‘Empirical Legal Studies: Sociology of Law or something ELS 
entirely?’ 13 AMICI 1 (2006); Chambliss, ibid; F. Bell, 'Empirical Research in Law', (2016) 25 (2) Griffith Law 
Review 262. 
20 Suchman, ibid; Suchman and Mertz, above n. 12; Chambliss, above n. 1. 
21 Blocq and van der Woude, above n. 12; Chambliss, above n. 1. 
22 Blocq and van der Woude, ibid. 
23 Suchman and Mertz, above n. 12; Blocq and van der Woude, ibid. 
need to move beyond textual interpretation if they wish their voice to be heard in policy 
debate.24 The specific contribution of ELS is to offer the kind of hard-nosed and digestible 
prescriptions that LS is less concerned with. Where frustration with doctrine concerns its lack 
of contextual awareness, reflectivity or self-critical capacity, LS is the more obvious 
response. Where that frustration concerns its inability to guide action, ELS fills a gap. 
Generational change, and the emergence of younger scholars with interdisciplinary PhDs 
fuels both responses.25 What was once a way for a young lawyer to distinguish themselves – 
some knowledge of social science methods or at least ideas – has become so orthodox that it 
shapes the mainstream. 
 
There are also more institutional considerations relevant to the emergence of ELS. It is 
primarily located in law schools considered to be among the elite in the US, and there are a 
number of reasons for this.26 One is that they have the funds to pay for relatively labour-
intensive and therefore expensive empirical research. ELS does not mandate a new kind of 
research, but rather brings together and consolidates empirical research relevant to law which 
previously took place primarily in faculties of social science, usually under a more traditional 
label, such as political science, criminology, sociology, or social psychology.27 That research 
continues in those faculties, but now faces competition from the ELS movement within law 
schools – a competitive challenge which only well-funded elite law schools would be able to 
make. 
 
                                               
24 Van Gestel and Micklitz, above n. 1 
25 Balkin, above n. 1; Bell, above n. 19. 
26 Balkin, above n. 1; Chambliss, above n. 1. 
27 Baldwin and Davis,  above n. 11; Blocq and van der Woude, above n. 12. 
For those law schools, what they have to gain is threefold: academic status, educational 
advantage, and policy influence. DLR is not a science, except perhaps in the most abstract 
hermeneutic sense, but rather an adjunct to a professional activity.28 While law schools enjoy 
wealth, good connections to power, and a certain social status, within the academy their 
output is often regarded as irrelevant to other branches of knowledge. ELS allows them to 
speak a language accepted elsewhere in the academic world, and broadens their sphere of 
influence.29 
 
ELS may also have an educational appeal. In the US, teaching is the major source of research 
funds and attracting the right students is central to academic success. Offering an element of 
ELS in the curriculum allows elite law schools to distinguish themselves, and to display the 
argument that the modern lawyer must be able to understand and use empirical data.30 Data-
driven law suits and legal practice are particularly found in corporate and commercial 
practice, where elite law schools often have their centre of gravity. In the US, the appeal of 
ELS to law students may lie in the idea that it gives them a competitive edge. In Europe, it 
may be more relevant that it opens up traditionally dry and dogmatic legal education, and 
offers the promise of an engagement with the issues of the day: that it makes a law degree 
less dull. Because continental law degrees are often seen as a general preparation for 
governmental or business work, rather than specifically for practice, law schools compete to 
                                               
28 Vranken, above n. 6; Balkin, above n. 1. 
29 A. Lang, ‘New Legal Realism, Empiricism, and Scientism: The Relative Objectivity of Law and Social 
Science’, 28 Leiden Journal of International Law 231 (2015); A. Bradney, ‘Law as a Parasitic Discipline’ 25 
Journal of Law and Society, 71 (§998). 
30 A. Bradney ‘The Place of Empirical Legal Research in the Law School Curriculum’, in P. Cane and H.M. 
Kritzer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research 1025 (2010) 
some extent with economics and politics faculties, and with the new breed of liberal-arts-
style degrees that are emerging in Europe. Rather than the aspirant student being forced to 
choose between learning about the world or learning about legal texts, a law curriculum with 
ELS offers the chance of doing both.31 
 
However, the most important motive for investing in ELS is probably the chance to extend 
policy influence.32 Lawyers are well-represented in networks of power, and law schools and 
law professors usually have little difficulty being heard in the policy world. However, they 
often have difficulty being listened to: where their contribution is confined to a normatively 
enhanced interpretative display it is not unusual for them to find themselves applauded, or 
attacked, and then ignored. Policy-makers typically seek data and evidence with which to 
back up their preferences – ‘the minister wants a number’ – and ELS allows legal institutions 
to supply this, along with the legal skills to translate that evidence into law. In a rhetorical 
reversal of the ELS mission, they can supply empirically sophisticated legal prescriptions. 
 
2.2 The critique of ELS 
 
Doctrinal academic lawyers have often welcomed ELS as a potential source of data to 
strengthen their normative arguments. Even more often, they simply exist alongside it – in 
law schools where ELS flourishes there are typically many professors who nevertheless do 
traditional DLR. Active criticism of the movement has come primarily from what might be 
seen as the methodological extremes: those with a mainstream social science background, or 
                                               
31 Bradney, ‘Law as a Parasitic Discipline’, above n. 29 
32 Towfigh, above n. 4. 
those who identify with the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement and its epistemological 
claims. 
 
The simplest critique, made by a number of social scientists, is that what goes under the name 
of ELS is typically of low quality, meaning that it is methodologically weak.33 The 
implication was that lawyers were moving into a field they did not understand and making a 
mess of it. This claim caused quite an uproar, and was fiercely contested.34 However, it is 
both a limited criticism, and one which raises deeper questions. 
 
It is limited in that it concerned only ELS which was published in legal journals. Not only is 
this research more likely to have been done by lawyers – who were not originally trained in 
empirical methods, but presumably ‘picked them up’ somewhere – but it will also be less 
likely to have faced review by peers with the relevant method background, especially where 
American student-run law journals are concerned.35 This raises questions about how to make 
                                               
33 L. Epstein and G. King, ‘The Rules of Inference’, 69 University of Chicago Law Review 114 (2002); M.J. 
Madison, ‘The Idea of the Law Review: Scholarship, Prestige and Open Access’, 10 Lewis and Clark Law 
Review 901 (2006); G.N. Rosenberg, ‘Across the Great Divide (Between Laws Political Science)’, 3 Green Bag 
267 (2000); M.L. Dauber, ‘The Big Muddy’, 57 Stanford Law Review 1899 (2005); F. B. Cross, ‘Political 
Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance’, 92 Northwestern 
University Law Review 251 (1997). 
34 Eisenberg (2011), above n. 13; F. Cross et al., ‘Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King’, 69 
University of Chicago Law Review 135 (2002); R. L. Revesz, ‘A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship’, 69 
University of Chicago Law Review 169 (2002); J. Goldsmith and A. Vermeule, ‘Empirical Methodology and 
Legal Scholarship’, 69 University of Chicago Law Review 153 (2002). See also discussion in Chambliss, above 
n. 1. 
35 Chambliss, ibid. 
an interdisciplinary research community work, and those questions certainly need to be 
considered by law journal editors and legal researchers engaging in empiricism, but they are 
not ones that cannot be answered. 
 
On the other hand, there is a deeper question raised about the ownership of method. The 
concern was about ‘quality’, but that is always defined by reference to a particular peer 
community, and the relevant question here is which community is, or should be, the relevant 
one: wherever a disciplinary community imports a method from another, one may expect the 
resulting research to take on a new character, not necessarily meeting the norms of its 
original users.36 Whether one wants to see this in terms of development, cross-fertilisation, 
(or, wonderfully, ‘cross-sterilisation’37) mutual learning, corruption, misunderstanding or 
misuse is context- and perspective-specific. However, transplants are never merely additive, 
always transformative. The more ELS succeeds in not just penetrating legal institutions, but 
also converting their members, the more it may find it becomes alienated from its source: 
many a missionary has gone native, become, in the eyes of their church, too pagan. Social 
scientists may not like the ELS in law journals, but perhaps lawyers do. 
 
By contrast, where ELS is published in traditional social science journals, of administration, 
governance, political science or criminology, it is more likely to have been done by people 
originally of that community, and to be methodologically orthodox. The quality critique was 
not made of this research. Rather, the question to be asked of this research is what makes it 
                                               
36 S. Macaulay, ‘A New Legal Realism: Elegant Models and the Messy Law in Action’, in Mertz, Macaulay and 
Mitchell above n. 16, 29. 
37 F.H. Easterbrook, ‘Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse’, University of Chicago Legal Forum 207 at 207 
(1996)  
ELS, rather than simply being political science, or criminology, etc? Is the label purely a 
feature of institutional location, or is there plausibly a substantive defining feature of ELS as 
a discipline of its own? If so, that feature must be to do with its relationship to law, rather 
than merely legal processes and power. As will be discussed, any such defining feature 
appears to be primarily aspirational rather than actual.38 
 
The more profound critique of ELS is that ‘the pull of the policy audience’ has turned it into 
a venue for superficial, simplistic and under-theorized work,39 seeking to produce convenient 
and bite-sized bits of policy advice but abandoning pretensions to fundamental thinking about 
either law or social science.40 ELS, it is widely perceived, tends to concentrate on readily 
quantifiable low-level issues of the legal process, where it is straightforward to find a variable 
that is both relevant to policy and measurable, and thus to generate results which can be 
easily translated into recommendations.41 Has a change in labour law led to more permanent 
contracts? Has a change in tenancy law reduced the number of conflicts over a certain issue? 
Do individuals feel more accepting of the outcome of a lawsuit if the judge speaks in lay 
language or highly technical terms? And so on. 
  
This kind of work is essentially applied research. It does not seek to add to or challenge 
prevailing theories regarding systems, processes or human behaviour but rather to give those 
theories practical application. It may be thought that in a situation of limited resources an 
                                               
38 See part 3.2 below. 
39 A. Sarat and S. Silbey, ‘The Pull of the Policy Audience’ 10 Law & Policy 97 (1988). 
40 Miles and Sunstein, above n. 12; Van Gestel and Micklitz, above n. 1; Baldwin and Davis, above n. 11; 
Suchman and Mertz, above n. 12 
41 Baldwin and Davis above n. 11; Suchman, above n. 19. 
ambitious university would want to shy away from work like this, which finds its natural 
home in government-sponsored research and policy institutes, but will not lead to grand new 
theories, paradigm shifts, or to mass citations in the most prestigious journals: it is not the 
stuff of which great universities are made.42 It may be more attractive to second-rank 
universities who do not think themselves capable of generating the most world-changing 
research, but in providing more modest, yet useful, results see a niche where they may be 
rendered safe thanks to their usefulness, a sustainable business model. For top US law 
schools, it should be noted that they often also employ distinguished philosophical and social 
theorists. ELS is not their only finger in the non-legal pie. For more modestly funded, and 
traditionally more dogmatic, European law faculties, precisely the limited ambitions of ELS 
may make it an accessible way of gaining a first foothold outside of DLR. 
 
The applied and applicable nature of ELS research brings other problems too. It invites over-
simplification and de-contextualisation.43 Practical advice needs causality, not just 
correlation, providing a temptation to insulate the subject of research from the complexities 
of reality through convenient assumptions and premises. Just as some economists adopted 
over-simplified views of human behaviour because that was necessary to enable them to 
produce workable and predictive theory,44 the temptation within ELS is not too think too 
deeply about the factors which may complicate a research result. If individuals are pleased 
when a judge addresses them in understandable lay language, may we conclude that this is a 
desirable addition to the legal process? Or should we go on to ask other questions – does that 
                                               
42 Baldwin and Davis ibid. 
43 Van Gestel and Micklitz, above n. 1; Suchman and Mertz, above n. 12. 
44 A.K. Sen, ‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory’, 6 Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 317 (1977); R. Thaler, Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics, (2015). 
satisfaction feed populist egoism? How do judges feel about this requirement? How will the 
judiciary change if the job is more communicative, less technical – will that politicise it? Will 
giving in to the demand that litigants be addressed on their own terms lead to assertiveness 
within the legal system, a customer-is-king entitlement mentality which has other 
consequences? What is the social role of intimidation and hierarchy within legal processes 
and indeed society? ELS traditionally does not follow a reflective or reflexive path: it quits 
when it is ahead, when it has a usable result, rather than going on to see how that result could 
in turn be undermined or turned around. At its most blunt, the critique might be that ELS 
seeks to measure, not to understand, although it must be emphasized that this is not inherent 
in the nature of ELS as a movement or practice, but merely a common perception of how it 
has tended to be performed to date.45 It may, in time, come to be seen as an unfair criticism, 
or one that was a symptom of youth. 
 
A more fundamental development of this criticism comes from CLS scholars, who challenge 
the very foundation of positivistic social science.46 The idea that the world can be studied 
‘objectively’ and that the object of this study can be distinguished from the person studying 
it, is rejected, in favour of the view that the objects of study, being social phenomena, are 
themselves constructed, in all their relational complexity, by the act of studying them.47 This, 
in the views of CLS scholars, gives a different task to the scholar, one of creating new 
consciousness, not revealing new facts. Trubek puts it beautifully (summarizing the views, 
                                               
45 D.M. Trubek and J. Esser, ‘Critical Empiricism in American Legal Studies: Paradox, Program, or Pandora's 
Box’, 14 Law & Social Inquiry 3 (1989). 
46 See also A. Argyrou, ‘Making the Case for Case Studies in Empirical Legal Research’, 13 Utrecht Law 
Review 95 (2017). 
47 For discussion see Bell, above n. 19. 
not endorsing them as his own): ‘The real problem is that the behaviorists’ methods accept 
the world as it seems to be, both to the observer and the observed. For the Critical scholar, 
this world is a dream, and the task of scholarship is not simply to understand the dream, but 
to awaken the dreamers.’48 In the American scholarship there has been a long-running call for 
a ‘critical empiricism’ and also a disappointment that this has not arisen, and that ELS 
continues to follow the path of ‘scientism’.49 
 
Many ELS scholars will reject these criticisms in principle, as showing a misunderstanding of 
what ELS is: it does not aim to promote a world-view, but to deliver relevant results. There 
may be an acceptance among ELS researchers that these results are indeed uncertain, limited, 
and the result of a degree of simplification, and even that they are an act of social 
construction, but all these things are the price of helping to guide experimental and evidence-
based policy – the jewel in the ELS crown.50 Policy-makers have more use for concrete data, 
even if imperfect or incomplete, than for a nuanced new theory which embraces complexity 
and inconclusiveness.51  
 
This leads to the final critique of ELS: that in practice it is not used to support evidence-based 
policy-making, but instead it is employed in a ‘symbolic’ way, to provide convenient support 
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and a veneer of technocracy to predetermined normative positions.52 The minister who wants 
to tax less or punish more goes looking for a report which backs her up, and no doubt 
supports funding for the next project from the research group which provides it.  
 
This somewhat depressing picture of ELS in action – rather than ELS in the books – may 
well be unfair. Those who do ELS will, it may be expected, tend to reject most of the 
criticisms above, but precisely because they are primarily empirical researchers they will tend 
not to write articles theorizing or critically analyzing the role and nature of ELS: those who 
do, and those who write about what doing is, are different, if overlapping, communities. 
Those, on the other hand, who do write such articles will tend to be drawn from the ranks of 
more theoretically inclined social scientists outside the law school, or non-empirical lawyers 
– precisely those threatened by ELS. Regarding the latter, one may comment that when a new 
and empirical discipline arises within a textually oriented and argumentative community it 
must expect robustly critical, penetrating, defensive, and often under-empiricized reactions: 
that’s what lawyers do; that’s why ELS exists.  
 
At any rate, the critique of the quality of ELS publications was itself attacked for 
methodological weakness,53 and the perception of ELS as under-theoretical is put forward by 
authors drawing on their experience, rather than being the conclusion of research which 
would meet ELS’s own methodological demands.54 The CLS challenge to social science is 
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intriguing, but often amounts to less than it seems when applied to a concrete case: when data 
is impressive, most readers (not all55) will forgive a degree of unreflective positivism. 
 
Nevertheless, sometimes it is enough to sow doubt. While the claim that DLR itself is 
tragically limited in what it can say about the world is beyond any doubt, it is clear that 
merely bringing empiricists into law schools and faculties does not necessarily result in fully-
rounded legal research. Whether or not they are factually true, the criticisms of ELS are 
coherent, and suggest that there is a need to think about what kind of empirical research is 
both enhanced by being in a law faculty – rather than being in a its more natural 
methodological home, a faculty of social science – and in turn enhances the other research 
which that faculty hosts. That question can be read broadly, for law schools often host 
philosophers, and legal theorists and other types of non-lawyer or quasi-lawyer too. However, 
here I wish to turn to the more specific question of how ELS and DLR can, do, and should 
inter-relate. 
 
3. THE  INTERDEPENDENCE OF DOCTRINAL AND EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
RESEARCH  
 
3.1 An idealized relationship 
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One can mentally frame ELS and DLR as parallel activities or intersecting ones.56 Do they in 
fact ask the same questions? There is no single answer to this, as each question can be seen as 
part of another one, so that the choice of how we place ELS and DLR in relation to each 
other is a product of our choice of frame, and in particular the level of abstraction at which 
we think. Each frame adds something to our understanding. 
 
At one level, they pursue different paths. The traditional doctrinal lawyer is initially 
concerned with the question ‘what is the law?’ and on the basis of an answer to that may go 
on to consider whether the law is coherent, and which values it expresses. Most doctrinal 
lawyers then indulge themselves in a normative comment on their findings and will often 
suggest likely consequences of the law in practice.  
 
By contrast, ELS asks where law and the practices of legal systems come from – which actors 
and institutions and social factors cause laws and practices to come into being – and what 
effects they have. It is concerned with how individuals and institutions and society respond to 
and are affected by laws, as well as how those laws are used by different actors. What is done 
with the law, and what does the law lead to, in the actual world? 
 
On another level of abstraction, one can see both of these activities as part of a common 
endeavor to decide what the law should be. Even if the individual researcher is not motivated 
by this – and many social scientists may be more interested in understanding social and 
psychological processes, whereas many doctrinal lawyers may be more interested in 
linguistic argument – most will accept that at least some of the value of their research is in 
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helping those who make the law take good decisions. Such people might be legislators, or 
judges who interpret. In either case, both doctrinal and empirical arguments could be relevant 
to their decision-making. The lawyer will show how to make texts coherent, and the 
meanings that words can plausibly bear, and the normative symbolism that they carry. The 
social scientist will show which practical consequences a rule or ruling will have.  
Certainly, neither of these tell us what we ought to do as such: many scientists will insist that 
the empirical and normative are non-overlapping categories. However, they are both 
necessary information for the person who does take normative decisions – they help provide 
a basis for deciding. Whether or not that is their goal, the lawyer and social scientist both 
make a distinct contribution to answering a complex and multi-sided question: what to do?  
 
 
This second frame hints at how ELS and DLR can also be seen as inter-related and even 
inter-dependent.57 For the lawyer, empirical research is necessary for them to achieve their 
normative ambitions.58 They may show that the text of the law permits e.g. the exclusion of a 
particular interest, or the rewarding of a particular kind of behaviour, and then, as lawyers do, 
may abhor or celebrate this. However, rules exist alongside other rules, and are embedded in 
social structures and norms, so that their actual effects cannot be conclusively known merely 
from studying them in isolation. A contract law that takes no account of the relative 
bargaining power of the parties, or a labour law that protects the rights of long-term 
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employees, or a corporate law that insists on the primacy of shareholder returns, might, on 
the basis of purely doctrinal analysis, be argued to send certain normative messages which 
may or may not be welcome. However, their actual effects in the world cannot be fully 
known by reasoning alone, and while important aspects of those effects might seem, at first 
glance, obvious, it is a truism that complex systems sometimes lead to unexpected results. 
Whether and to what extent weaker parties benefit from paternalistic contract law, or 
employees benefit from labour rights, or society is harmed by profit primacy are empirical 
questions. Perhaps simple law aids weaker parties more than protective law, or employment 
protection leads to demoralizing work environments or amoral corporate law leads to 
progressive voluntary social movements whereas progressive corporate law crowds out 
responsibility and compassion. Who really knows, without investigation of these things? To 
be taken seriously as commentary on the world – rather than just as an aid to practitioners – 
legal scholarship needs empirics.59 Dagan, Kreitner and Kritcheli-Katz note that even Kelsen 
said that law should be effective – and thereby put empirics at the heart of law’s legitimacy.60 
 
The dependence in the other direction is less obvious, but there to be found. For inasmuch as 
ELS studies how the law comes into being, and which effects it has, it matters what the law 
actually is.61 That may in some cases be evident to any lay person who reads the text, but it is 
the non-lawyer’s traditional mistake to think that legality is obvious. In many situations 
knowing what is actually prohibited and what is allowed is a complex matter that is the 
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subject of the doctrinal lawyer’s expertise. Procedure, for example, may interact with 
substance so that an apparent prohibition can be dissolved away by procedural or evidential 
games. Higher norms or principles may constrain lower ones, so that apparently strict rules 
turn out to be flexible or contingent. Doctrinal research, it may be said, reveals the structures 
of incentives in the law, in their full complexity, with their gaps and nuances and the way that 
these may be used. Without this knowledge, the empiricist has no idea whether what they are 
measuring has anything to do with the law, and so, as an honest empiricist, they do not know 
what to measure.62 
 
An idealized relationship between DLR and ELS thus seems to be one of theory and 
observation, not unlike that which might be found in other sciences.63 The lawyer reveals the 
incentives in the law, and suggests likely consequences. The social scientist brings additional 
psychological and social theory, to provide a more developed model of consequences: and 
then tests it.64 Without the doctrine, the empirical research is incompletely theorized. Without 
the empirical research, the lawyer is condemned to speculation (as is the legal philosopher: 
see Galligan65) DLR and ELS are two techniques which can only make persuasive statements 
about the world if they work together.66 Bringing ELS to law faculties then seems logical. 
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3.2 The relationship in practice 
 
The above does not appear to be a good description of how ELS and DLR interrelate in 
practice. Rather than inter-dependence they move in relative indifference to and ignorance of 
each other.67 ELS is in fact most focused on aspects of the legal system which do not require 
detailed engagement with doctrine, such as criminology, victimology, and more institutional 
issues such as the working of courts and the behaviour of judges.68 Even where empirical 
research is done on substantive legal questions, it tends to focus on easily measurable 
variables, such as case outcomes, or language patterns in judicial decisions.69  
 
Certainly, there are exceptions to this. There is a growing body of scholarship which 
genuinely tries to integrate the legal and empirical in its explanations of legal processes, and 
to theorise their relationship.70 In particular, there has been attention to the role of legal 
theory as a part of the frame for empirical research.71 However, the involvement of legal 
theory inevitably gives the research a complex conceptual basis, and does not facilitate the 
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delivery of punchy answers to immediate policy questions. This work tends to be less 
quantitative and more qualitative than mainstream ELS, and more focused on empirical 
validation and investigation of legal theoretical concepts than on serving policy as it is 
understood by policy makers. On the one hand, it offers the possibility of an enormously rich 
and novel approach to thinking about law, while still taking the content of the law seriously.72 
On the other, it takes a different path, and offers different functionality, to the mass of ELS 
research. For these reasons, it is not the kind of research that is being pushed within law 
schools as part of the ELS wave. In implicit recognition of this distance from the practice-
oriented search for measurability, those doing it tend to self-identify under the New Legal 
Realism flag, rather than ELS.73 Thus while the DLR-ELS relationship is receiving attention, 
that attention is largely outside the DLR-ELS axis itself. Those who self-identify, and are 
perceived, as falling within the ELS movement, largely manage to avoid engaging with the 
complexity of law, or legal thinking.74 
 
That researchers trained in quantitative methods focus on the measurable is hardly strange: if 
you have a hammer, the world looks like a nail. Yet in avoiding research questions which 
require engagement with the nuance and complexity of doctrine empirical researchers raise 
the question whether what they are doing is not merely criminology, sociology, or political 
science. Why the ELS label? Where is the legal sophistication which was promised? That 
may of course not matter to them – ELS is primarily something that law schools and faculties 
like to proclaim an interest in, rather than an identity for researchers. However, it invites us to 
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consider whether the use of the ELS brand is not above all a political move: an attempt to 
claim branches of social and human sciences for the legal academy – rather as economists 
have tried to claim aspects of psychology for themselves by calling those aspects 
‘behavioural economics’. Whether this is the case, and if so, why, would be a worthy study in 
itself – but not one that I can pursue further here. 
 
This article is more concerned with the consequences for research, and for understanding, 
that this distance between ELS and DLR brings. One risk is that where empirical research 
focusses on concrete variables such as outcomes or word patterns it risks missing the 
importance of judicial decisions, since this often lies less in the immediate outcome of the 
case and more in the doctrine that is laid down, whose consequences may appear over years, 
and in other fields.75 Interpretation, the lawyer’s art, helps see how statements of law may 
grow, change, and exert influence within the wider legal field. Reducing cases to their non-
doctrinal aspects, or reading laws without doctrinal context, gives a static and potentially 
misleading picture of what laws and judges are actually doing.76 
 
Indeed, it has been commented that ELS tends to see laws as propositions to be tested: a law 
represents a policy intention, and the question is whether it has been achieved.77 One 
difficulty with this instrumental understanding is that the aims within law are often far more 
complex and even contradictory than is first apparent. A law is a political compromise whose 
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symbolic, disruptive, second-order and indirect effects may be as essential to its nature as its 
apparent direct purpose.  
 
In ‘testing’ laws, empirically, researchers engage in what has been called, by LS scholars 
primarily, ‘gap studies’: what is the gap between law in the books and law in action?78 The 
risk of over-simplification of the law, discussed in the preceding paragraphs, is a symptom of 
a more structural problem with this way of thinking about law: it problematizes the gap as 
such, as if the ‘wish’ of law should ‘be’ the reality of behaviour.79 There is an implicit naïve 
positivism.80 
 
Yet law is not a description of the world. Even as an ideal this is problematic – the capacity 
to disobey, and a diversity of responses to rules, are part of the humanity that law aims to 
protect. It is certainly inadequate as a theoretical paradigm for studying how law actually 
works. Rather, law needs to be understood in a much broader sense, as an intervention, an 
expression, and a tool, which may be used in different ways in different circumstances, and 
which may restructure incentives and cause actors to behave differently, and perhaps even 
reform ways of thinking and being. An excessive focus on ‘the gap’ will lead researchers to 
ignore the many other aspects of law and the complexity and diversity of its effects, and this 
in turn may tempt them into simplistic prescriptions, assessing the desirability of a law purely 
on its first-order consequences, as if the possibilities created, the messages sent, the ideas 
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inspired and the interactions with other rules were mere side-effects, when sometimes they 
are what matters most, and mostly they matter enough to be taken into account.81  
 
3.3 The Potential Gains and Losses 
 
The question remains: who wins and who loses? A simple utopian story is as follows: 
bringing ELS to law schools means that law schools will produce more relevant and useful 
research, which is more scientific in character.82 Their status – and potential funding83 – will 
be enhanced within the academy. Instead of merely serving law firms, they will serve society. 
They will also become more attractive to students, as they become able to fulfil the youthful 
need to engage not just with rules but with social issues. Law teachers - doctrinal lawyers - 
will see their work become important outside their immediate circle, as it becomes the basis 
of empirical research and testing which can lead to new policy and law. They will be part of a 
socially important scientific process, not just an adjunct to practice, and not just participants 
in an insular legal-theoretical conversation. Empirical legal scholars, the social scientists 
within law schools, will find that as their work becomes legally more sophisticated, and more 
relevant to specific and actual laws, it is more appealing and useful to legal and policy actors, 
and is likely to have more impact.  
 
The downsides, the losers, are to be found in the silences in the story above. Firstly, there is 
likely to be pressure to produce ‘testable’ doctrinal research. DLR may become simpler and 
more transparent, more modular and digestible. The kind of legal scholarship which deploys 
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untested and untestable social and political ‘theories’ and nevertheless reaches normative 
conclusions, may be marginalized. For some that may be a welcome growing-up for legal 
scholarship, as lawyers learn not to claim too much, and to be more Popperian and modest. 
Yet legal scholarship has traditionally had a political function more than a scientific one: it 
develops ideas about law and power which even if they are not proven, nor provable, resonate 
in public debate and cause change. If law is to become part of science, this rhetorical, 
inspirational, and speculative function risks being subordinated to the slower and more 
incremental search for measurable ‘truth’.84 
 
The question, perhaps, is what use we have for theory which cannot be realistically tested. 
Some would say ‘none’ – and if publication in empirically oriented journals is our standard, 
then that answer will be correct. Yet an alternative answer is that empirics is slow, difficult 
and unreliable, particularly in the social sciences. To reach sophisticated and definitive 
conclusions on how laws work often takes too long – politics sometimes has to act now. 
Fortunately, there are other forms of knowledge about society – the lived experience which is 
the basis of political views, or the common sense which lawyers and judges have traditionally 
used. Claims can, in the political and the personal spheres, and indeed in the legal, be judged 
in other ways than by social science methods. Almost all individuals, including empirical 
social scientists, take normative standpoints on issues where they are not familiar with the 
empirical evidence, or where that evidence is absent or incomplete. Legal scholarship helps 
this, by providing arguments and analysis. 
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An alternative response to the challenges of measurement is to use qualitative methods. ELS 
is largely associated with the quantitative. For the lawyer whose normative claims are too 
grandiose or complex (essentially, politically, indeterminable) for easy quantitative testing, 
the qualitative may offer relief. To reduce a critical legal perspective, or a post-colonial or 
post-modern one, to quantifiable and measurable variables may be a challenge – although no 
doubt some will embrace it, sometimes. To develop it empirically via qualitative measures 
may be more welcome – to use interviews, stories, first-person perspectives, anthropological 
immersion and observation, and so on. There is a natural synergy between the low-n social 
scientist and the theoretically minded legal scholar.85 One begins with words and the other 
with people, but each is more interested in sketching the contours of a vision of society which 
they grasp, intermittently and incompletely, than in describing that vision in quantitative 
terms. They are content to extrapolate from the personal. 
 
The risk for traditional ELS is that in law schools it is put under pressure to become more 
methodologically embracing, and to accept empirical methods more sympathetic to what 
lawyers want to do. Qualitative methods may allow lawyers to reach out more effectively to 
colleagues in the humanities and some social scientists, and even to the public, but they may 
undermine the status of ELS in the worlds where it currently moves, the methodologically 
strict quantitative branches of social science. This is particularly so if the research is self-
consciously ‘critical’, aiming to reveal false consciousness rather than facts.86 The label of 
ELS may become unattractive to those doing quantitative science, who may prefer to be 
identified by their training as sociologists, psychologists, or even economists. ELS may 
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become a flag abandoned by its first carriers and then borne aloft by a new tribe. In legal 




Both DLR and ELS are searching for their place in the academic world. Doctrinal lawyers are 
frustrated with the limits of their knowledge and skills, and seek to engage with empirics in 
order to broaden their descriptive and normative scope. They do not necessarily want to do 
empirical research – most lawyers writing about empirical research do not actually do it88-  
but they want to draw on it, and they want it to be research that meets their needs and their 
questions.89  
 
ELS is still primarily conventional social science, and has not yet shown what it is that 
defines it as a discipline – Suchman describes it as an ‘“I” in search of a “me”’.90 The 
obvious answer, legal sophistication, part of its original raison d’etre, has not yet been 
realized to any great extent. Without that, it offers little sustenance to lawyers, and has little 
identity of its own. 
 
Understanding of the law could be greatly enhanced if empirical and doctrinal methods could 
be brought together – if research questions could be jointly formulated and results jointly 
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assessed. This is surely the intention of investment by law schools in ELS. But at the same 
time, the two should not rush into each other’s arms uncritically.  
 
For empiricists, the risk is methodological corruption. If they embrace interdisciplinarity too 
enthusiastically, they may lose status and standing in the methodologically strict wider social 
science world, and become one of the bubbles in which academia abounds: self-citing 
communities that through some accident of financing enjoy institutional stability and strong 
internal coherence, but have limited external influence. It would not be a happy end. 
 
For lawyers, the risk is watering down of their primary role as makers of arguments – or 
developers of ideas if one prefers. Legal interpretation is not a science, but it is a skill that 
provides influential and valuable conceptual input into academia, politics and society. If legal 
scholarship were to become safe, as scholars focused their interpretation on matters suitable 
for empirical research, the societal loss would be enormous. It would be as if natural 
scientists decided to abandon the development of theory in order to apply what they already 
had: a short term rush of useful results would mask longer term stagnation of ideas. It may 
be, of course, that in a time of polarization, where universities and governments are quite 
often at odds, that this is precisely what (some) government funders want. 
  
